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Comments of Financial Regulation and Consumer Protection Scholars  
on Docket No. CFPB-2018-0002 
  
May 7, 2018 
Monica Jackson 
Office of the Executive Secretary 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
1700 G Street NW 
Washington, DC 20552 
  
Dear Ms. Jackson: 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “Bureau”) has requested, in its notice dated 
February 5, 2018, “comments and information from interested parties to assist the Bureau in 
considering whether and how to amend the Bureau’s Rules of Practice for Adjudication 
Proceedings.” 83 Fed. Reg. 5055 (Feb. 5, 2018), Docket No. CFPB-2018-0002.  
We are lawyers and law professors, some of whom have studied administrative adjudication by 
financial regulators, and the principal drafters of our comment have no financial or other 
relationship with parties that have participated in the Bureau’s administrative proceedings. We 
can provide evidence that can inform the Bureau’s assessment of where to direct its regulatory 
reform resources. Many of the below signatories also have experience in public enforcement of 
consumer protection laws. We appreciate the opportunity to submit these comments for your 
consideration. 
David Zaring,  
Associate Professor of Legal Studies & Business Ethics, The Wharton School 
 
Jayme Wiebold 
Penn Law ‘18 
 
William Black 
Associate Professor of Economics and Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City 
 
Prentiss Cox  
Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School 
 
Kathleen Engel 
Research Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School 
 
Robert Fellmeth 
Price Professor of Public Interest Law, University of San Diego School of Law 
 
Jeffrey Gentes 





Edward Cornell Professor of Law, Cornell University 
 
Dalié Jiménez 
Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law 
 
Kathryn Judge 
Professor, Columbia Law School 
 
Adam Levitin 




Professor of Practice in Administrative Law, American University, Washington College of Law  
 
Cathy Lesser Mansfield 
Professor of Law, Drake University Law School 
 
Nathalie Martin 




Professor of Law, Boston College Law School 
 
Gary Pieples 
Teaching Professor, Syracuse University College of Law 
 
David Reiss 
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School 
 
Jacob Russell 
Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School 
 
Amy J. Schmitz 
Elwood L. Thomas Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law 
 
Alexandra Sickler 
Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law 
 
John Spanogle 






Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles  
 
Arthur Wilmarth 
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School 
 
Eric Wright 





In our view, the Bureau should put its limited regulatory reform resources to use in other, more 
pressing areas. We write to make three main points.  
First, the Bureau has not made much use of its Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) program – and 
indeed, for a long time did not have its own ALJ. To begin, the Bureau borrowed an ALJ from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. It has utilized administrative adjudication in eight 
contested matters in its entire history. All but two of these cases were settled, for, in the case of 
Auto Cash Leasing, a $10,000 civil monetary penalty,1 in the case of Interstate Lending, a $4,000 
civil monetary penalty,2 in the case of Oasis Title Loans, a $20,000 civil monetary penalty,3 in 
the case of Phoenix Title Loans, a $40,000 civil monetary penalty,4 in the case of Presto Auto 
Loans, a $125,000 civil monetary penalty,5 and in the case of 3D Resorts-Bluegrass, a $1 civil 
monetary penalty and a restitution order that could amount to $50,000.6 These modest penalties 
were accompanied by other commitments from the defendants, but the sums involved do not 
raise the prospect of great hardships. There has been only one large award in the history of the 
Bureau’s administrative proceedings – PHH Corp. was ordered to pay restitution and 
disgorgement in the amount of $6,442,399,7 an award increased on review by the director, which 
in turn was reversed by the D.C. Circuit at both the panel and en banc level. See PHH Corp. v. 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  
Diverting regulatory reform resources to solve purported problems in a program that is utilized 
so rarely by the Bureau would be an inefficient use of the Bureau’s limited, and very valuable, 
time. Indeed, there has not yet been a chance to see whether the current rules are good ones. 
Once more cases are sent to administrative adjudication, a more informed decision can be made 
about whether and how to reform the process. In the meantime, the Bureau would be poorly 
served by choosing to invest its resources in reforming a program that it barely makes use of, that 
                                                          
1 The CFPB’s order may be found at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/20170130_cfpb_2016-CFPB-
0017_Document-026.pdf. 
2 The CFPB’s order may be found at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201612_cfpb_0018-Document030-
12202016.pdf. 
3 The CFPB’s order may be found at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/2016-CFPB-
0019_Document_017_11012016.pdf. 
4 The CFPB’s order may be found at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201703_cfpb_2016-CFPB-
0020_Document-027.pdf. 
5 The CFPB’s order may be found at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201612_cfpb_0021-Document027-
12202016.pdf. 
6 The CFPB’s order may be found at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201312_cfpb_consent-order_3dresorts-
bluegrass.pdf.  





has been adequately policed through judicial review, and where it can, at the Director’s 
discretion, reduce Bureau usage still further.  
Second, even though they are rarely utilized by the Bureau, administrative proceedings are not a 
miscarriage of justice that requires attention in the first place. Empirical studies of ALJ decision-
making in financial regulation matters, one of which one of us conducted, show that defendants 
win about as often before ALJs as they do in federal court. See David Zaring, Enforcement 
Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1184-85 (2016). And decades of precedent 
establish the principle that the lengthy process afforded defendants in formal administrative 
proceedings is comparable to that of federal court and is adequate under the law.  ALJ cases are 
resolved more quickly, as a general matter, than district court cases, but the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that those cases are comparable with regard to the quality of process provided. 
we expand upon this point in the discussion below. 
Third, if the Bureau does wish to devote its resources to reforming its administrative 
proceedings, we have reviewed those rules and the questions in the Bureau’s request for 
information, and recommend one small change. We find its proceedings to be consistent with the 
way those proceedings work in other agencies. The SEC has, however, recently extended the 
length of time for decision from four to eight months. A longer timeline, while still being short 
and efficient for all parties, gives the defendant more time to prepare the case. The Bureau could 
do something similar with its own rocket docket, though it may be that section 1081.400, which 
permits a 300 day timeframe without Director approval, meets this need. We expand on this 
point in the discussion section below. 
Discussion 
Formal administrative proceedings vary somewhat between agencies, but all such proceedings 
must meet the minimum requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, and so broadly 
involve an impartial decisionmaker, the opportunity to present evidence, a hearing, cross-
examination, and a panoply of other procedural rights. As the Bureau has observed, “The APA is 
designed to guarantee the decisional independence of administrative law judges and ensure 
fairness in administrative proceedings before federal government agencies.”8 ALJs conduct 
hearings “in a manner similar to federal bench trials,” giving parties the opportunity to submit 
briefs, and preparing decisions that contain proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.9  
The Supreme Court has confirmed that procedural protections offered by administrative hearings 
are comparable to federal district court procedures. See e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. Ports 
Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 758 (2002) (“[T]he role of the ALJ . . . is similar to that of an Article III 
judge.”); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (“[T]he role of the modern . . . 
administrative law judge . . . is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge.”). The Court has 
held that the fact that proceedings that are brought inside an agency before an ALJ indicate that 
the requirements of due process are satisfied rather than violated. See e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, 
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248–52 (1980) (holding that a civil penalty system permitting payment of 
                                                          
8 CFPB, Administrative Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/administrative-
adjudication-proceedings/ (last visited April 17, 2018). 
9 Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. SEC & Exchange Commission, https://www.sec.gov/alj (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2018).   
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fines assessed by an administrative law judge to a federal agency did not violate due process 
because it was “the administrative law judge, not the [Employment Standards Administration], 
who performs the function of adjudicating child labor violations”); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 
35, 58 (1975) (broadly affirming the consistency of agency adjudicative procedures with due 
process). Moreover, there is no evidence that ALJs treat defendants unfairly. 
While the CFPB has a relatively short history using ALJs, the SEC has used ALJs for many 
decades. Thus, studies of SEC ALJs are illustrative as the Bureau evaluates its ALJ rules. These 
studies have uniformly found that SEC ALJs are impartial and are not more favorable to the SEC 
than federal judges are.  
One of us conducted a study of a five-year sample of SEC ALJ cases. See David Zaring, 
Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1184-85 (2016). According to a 
regression analysis, no one ALJ was more or less likely to rule for the SEC than any other SEC 
ALJ. And while the agency lost only a handful of cases during that period, in either 
administrative proceedings or in federal court, the ALJs did not award the SEC the full relief the 
agency had sought in 29% of cases. The results of the SEC study are consistent with the rule-of-
thumb rate for victories by any federal agency in federal court which, when various studies are 
pooled, comes out to about 69%. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 170 
(2010).  The 71% success rate for administrative proceedings, in other words, was right in line 
with the success rate of most agencies in federal court. 
We can be even more specific: the record for cases brought in federal court by the SEC is very 
similar to the agency’s record in administrative proceedings. A comparison between the cases 
brought by the SEC in the Southern District of New York during the five years following the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and administrative 
proceedings the SEC commenced against defendants during the same period are revealing. The 
district, which covers Manhattan, is ground zero for securities enforcement in the federal courts. 
The judges have extensive experience with securities fraud cases, both civil and criminal, and 
some of the judges have a reputation for putting the agency through its paces. Of the 119 such 
reported cases in the district, the SEC success rate was high; it received a positive result in 111 
of the tracked cases, a 92% win rate.  
Over the sample period, these results make the SEC look like a comparably victorious enforcer 
regardless of the forum in which it chose to pursue enforcement; there is no statistically 
significant distinction between the rates of success. With 8 failures in Manhattan district court in 
the five years following the passage of Dodd-Frank, and only 6 losses in the 168 enforcement 
proceedings the SEC brought before its ALJs during the same period, a 96% win rate, there is 
little evidence that the forum chosen by the SEC resulted in stark advantages for the agency 
either way. 
Other empirical studies of the ALJs have also found no evidence of bias towards the agency. See 
Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Biased? An Empirical Investigation, 
92 WASH. L. REV. 315 (2017); Joseph A. Grundfest, Fair or Foul?: SEC Administrative 
Proceedings and Prospects for Reform Through Removal Legislation, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1143, 1178 (2016) (“there is no statistically significant difference between the SEC's success rate 
before ALJs and its success rate in federal court”). 
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All the evidence suggests, in sum, that defendants receive abundant process in formal 
administrative proceedings, and that they do as well in those proceedings as they do in federal 
court.  There is no injustice in administrative proceedings in general that would be solved by 
increasing the procedural burdens on those proceedings.  Nor has the Bureau utilized 
enforcement proceedings in contested cases frequently enough to reveal any problems with those 
proceedings, making a redo premature. 
We finish with some specific comments addressing some of the Bureau’s specific questions, and 
describe why most of the rules should not be altered. In the final comment, we propose one 
modest change that might be worth the Bureau’s consideration if it does decide to revisit the 
administrative proceedings rules: 
1. The Bureau has asked whether “a policy of proceeding in federal court in all instances would 
be preferable.” Administrative proceedings benefit both the Bureau and other agencies when it 
comes to recording settlements and processing uncontested enforcement actions. In these cases, 
administrative proceedings can serve as an efficient alternative for vindicating agency policy 
without the expense and complications of going to federal court.  These cost savings inure to 
respondents as well as to agencies. 
Although it has only diverted eight initially contested cases to administrative proceedings, the 
Bureau has filed 110 stipulation and consent orders before ALJs during this period; these cases 
were settled the day they were brought, and therefore required little process from the agency 
adjudicator. The SEC, for its part, has relied on its administrative law judges to handle 
settlements and enforcement actions against nonreporting companies, or to process follow-on 
civil sanctions, after court convictions for violations of the securities laws. This sort of routine 
enforcement work makes up the bulk of what those agency ALJs do. The Bureau would benefit 
from having the option of pursuing administrative cases in these contexts even if it decided to 
handle contested and other enforcement matters in federal court. At the very least, this option 
should be preserved. But of course, in addition to uncontested cases, administrative proceedings 
can be useful in contested actions as well. As mentioned above, administrative proceedings 
provide the Bureau with an option that will save both the Bureau and the defendant time and 
resources, while still providing the defendant sufficient due process. 
2. The Bureau has asked whether it should “expressly adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence” and 
in particular the hearsay rule. Anyone who has appeared before an adjudicator knows that the 
adjudicator can discount third party evidence, and no one thinks that the hearsay rule, as 
expressed in the Federal Rules of Evidence, with all of its exceptions, is a paragon of 
consistency. The Bureau sensibly adopted section 1081.303(b) to establish rules of evidence that 
were “consistent with general administrative practice.”  It would be far better to retain the usual 
rules of evidence that non-jury adjudications employ. 
3. Permitting defendants to be “afforded the opportunity to stay a decision of the Director 
pending appeal by filing a superseadeas bond, consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
62(d)” poses two different problems, depending upon the meaning of the inquiry.  If the point of 
such a change would be to permit litigants to avoid Director review of a preliminary decision by 
an ALJ, the amendment would not be consistent with the separation of powers doctrines 
expressed by cases such as Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
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Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010), which stood for the proposition that executive officers 
accountable to the President had to make the final decisions in administrative adjudications. 
Staying an interim executive branch action before an officer of the United States could review 
the decision would unconstitutionally permit the courts to review enforcement actions before 
politically accountable executive branch officers had a chance to conduct their own review of the 
initial decisions made in those actions.  Similar problems would be posed if the stay of a Director 
decision would be automatic, under the agency’s rules, upon the posting of a bond.  On the other 
hand, if the amendment of the rules is meant to make the superseadeas bond more available in 
judicial proceedings reviewing the Director’s decision, then the Federal Rules of Civil and 
Appellate Procedure would apply, and the Bureau’s own administrative proceedings rules would 
be irrelevant. 
4. The Bureau asks whether there should be changes to the requirements that the Bureau make 
documents available to the party for inspection, and whether there should be changes to the 
requirements for issuing subpoenas, specifically whether counsel for a party should be entitled to 
issue subpoenas without leave of the hearing officer. These provisions both work to ensure that 
administrative proceedings are fair and efficient. The production rule ensures that defendants 
have access to all materials the Bureau relied on in its investigation. This renders the traditional 
discovery process unnecessary, and therefore the subpoena power much less useful. The hearing 
officer’s input on a subpoena request ensures that frivolous requests do not delay the process, 
and presents very minimal due process concerns because the party already has access to all the 
same information that the Bureau possesses.  
5. The Bureau asks whether it should revise the limitations on the number of expert witnesses 
that may be called as provided in 12 CFR 1081.210(b). As discussed above, it is well established 
that the administrative hearings at the SEC afford defendants appropriate due process, including 
limits on the number of expert witnesses that may be called. Expert witnesses are sometimes 
valuable, but can increase the complexity and costs of proceedings for all parties, their use 
should accordingly be measured.   The long history of ALJ utilization of experts, at the SEC and 
elsewhere, in proceedings that the Supreme Court has reviewed dozens of times without 
complaint, suggests that there is no concern that limitations on expert witnesses infringe on due 
process rights.  The Bureau also asks whether it should incorporate the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in regards to the required disclosures of expert witnesses. It is reasonable to expect an 
ALJ to have the legal competence necessary to understand an expert witness’ function and 
qualifications without recourse to the full panoply of procedures required by the court procedural 
rules. 
6.  Regulated industry has indicated that it finds mandatory arbitration to be an attractive way to 
resolve consumer disputes.  In many ways, the benefits of efficiency and cost that accrue to 
mandatory arbitration also accrue when the CFPB enforces claims through ALJs.  Both processes 
would seem to ultimately lower costs to consumers and regulated industry. 
7. A benefit to both the agency and regulated industry is the fast nature of administrative 
proceedings. The Bureau’s rules call for proceedings to commence within 30 to 60 days of the 
notice of charges, and currently disfavors motions for extensions of time. If the Bureau does 
decide to re-examine its procedural rules, it might lengthen the window for this process to 
guarantee that the proceedings are resolved within a year, rather than within six months. The 
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SEC doubled the length of time between complaint and hearing to eight months from four.10 It 
did so after complaints that defendants had insufficient time to prepare for litigation, while the 
agency could spend unlimited time investigating a case before filing. On the other hand, formal 
proceedings that last too long are expensive and burdensome for both defendants and the agency. 
Finally, it may be that section 1081.400, which permits a 300 day timeframe for the resolution of 
administrative proceedings without Director approval, meets this need, though the question has 
come up so infrequently, that it is not entirely clear (it is true, however, that in one case, 
administrative proceedings did not commence until seven months after the filing of the 
complaint). It might be appropriate to ensure that administrative proceedings are resolved within 
one year. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Bureau should not revisit its administrative proceedings 
regulations. Administrative adjudication in and of itself is not a problematic process, but rather is 
a process that provides sufficient due process and saves both sides time and expense. Further, the 
Bureau should not choose to invest its resources in reforming a program that it barely makes use 
of, that has been adequately policed through judicial review, and where it can reduce Bureau 
usage further at the Director’s discretion. Please do not hesitate to get in touch with David Zaring 
if you have any questions about this comment, or wish to enlarge upon the issues therein in any 
way. 
                                                          
10 17 C.F.R. § 201.360. 
